I search for a "scale" effect in countries. I use a panel data set that includes 200 countries over forty years and link the population of a country to a host of economic and social phenomena. Using both graphical and statistical techniques, I search for an impact of size on the level of income, inflation, material well-being, health, education, the quality of a country's institutions, heterogeneity, and a number of different international indices and rankings. I have little success; small countries are more open to international trade than large countries, but are not systematically different otherwise.
Motivation and Summary
Countries differ a lot in size. As of July 2005, there were over 64,000 Chinese for each of the 20,303 residents of Palau. 1 There are now eleven countries with populations in excess of 100 million, and eleven with populations less than 100 thousand. This is a striking fact; there appears to be no optimal country size, and no noticeable convergence towards one.
2 Nations do not come in standard sizes. This may seem natural, even obvious; after all, there is enormous variation in the size of firms and cities (as well as mammals and galaxies, among other things). 3 This variation leads to an interesting question that is the subject of this short exploratory paper: does the size of a country matter? I take a broad-brush empirical approach and ask whether larger countries perform systematically different than larger countries in a number of different economic and social dimensions. They do not.
Why Might Size Matter?
There has been little quantitative work that on the linkages between country size and country performance. Accordingly, as an exploratory analysis this paper takes the "Estimate, don't test" message seriously. But while there is little empirical work, numerous theorists have discussed the effects of national size, especially in recent economics and not-so-recent political philosophy. Much recent economics has "scale effects" so that larger countries should be more successful countries. At the other extreme, a number of celebrated political philosophers argue that smaller countries make better states. There is also a strand of reasoning that articulates a tradeoff between the benefits and costs of size. I now review these briefly; my objective is simply to point out that size matters in a number of different literatures.
Bigger is Better. Size has an effect on output in a number of different recent literatures of interest in economics. Increasing returns remain an intrinsic part of the "new wave" trade theory that began in the 1980s, and lead to offshoots in economic geography and urban economics.
Agglomeration effects are also an important element of endogenous macroeconomic growth.
Finally, they are part of the political economy literature that focuses on the provision of public goods. There is also a long tradition in political philosophy arguing that size is positively disadvantageous. Helpman and Krugman (1985) analyze the impact of increasing returns on trade, and discuss economies of scale both internal and external to the firm. The former can be due to plant-runs or dynamic scale economies; while the latter can be due to an effect of scale on the variety of intermediate inputs, effects on market structure, or information spillovers. When there are increasing returns to scale and transportation costs, countries also exert a "home market effect" (Krugman, 1980) . Agglomeration effects are also used in modeling urban dynamics as part of the new economic geography (e.g., Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999 and RossiHansberg and Wright, 2004) . Indeed, the importance of numerous "border" effects is consistent with the fact that a number of economic relations are more efficient within a single country than in separate countries (Hess and van Wincoop, 2000; .
The literature on scale effects in macroeconomics stretches back a long way to Adam
Smith's idea that the specialization of labor is limited by the extent of the market. Robinson (1960) lists a number of reasons why there might be scale effects across countries, including:
enhanced intra-national integration (of capital, goods, and especially labor and services markets);
higher productivity due to enhanced specialization or longer production runs; a scale effect on competition; and greater ability to respond flexibly to technological progress.
Much recent work in growth theory has formalized such scale effects. Many models rely on learning by doing and/or knowledge spillovers, and result in the conclusion that larger countries should grow faster: e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) . Indeed, scale effects are generic to endogenous growth models (Aghion and Howitt, 1998 p 28) . Jones (1999, p 143) discusses three classes of endogenous growth models and shows that they all have a scale effect:
"the size of the economy affects either the long-run growth rate or the long-run level of per capita income" since larger countries can support more research which delivers a higher level or growth rate of productivity. A recent survey provided by Ventura (2005) refers (p 92) to "the standard idea that economic growth in the world economy is determined by a tension between diminishing returns and market size effects to capital accumulation."
The most authoritative work of relevance in public economics is the recent book by Alesina and Spolaore (2003) , hereafter AS. They list (pp 3-4) five benefits of large population size: 1) lower per-capita costs of public goods (monetary and financial institutions, judicial system, communication infrastructure, police and crime prevention, public health, etc) and more efficient tax systems; 2) cheaper per-capita defense and military costs; 3) greater productivity due to specialization (though access to international markets may reduce this effect); 4) greater ability to provide regional insurance; and 5) greater ability to redistribute income within the country.
Tradeoffs Exist. In all this work, larger countries are predicted to be richer or more efficient. There is little analysis of the costs of size. AS discuss two costs of larger country size.
A minor consideration is the potential for administrative and/or congestion costs. The only real issue of import is that larger countries have more diverse preferences, cultures, and languages.
The AS hypothesis (p 6) is that "on balance, heterogeneity of preferences tends to bring about political and economic costs that are traded off against the benefits of size." 4 This reasoning is not new. In chapter XVII of the Leviathan Hobbes argued that small populations were insufficient to deter invasion and provide security, while excessively large countries would be incapable of the common defense because of lack of a common purpose and internal distractions. Olson (1982) argues that small homogenous societies are less burdened by the logic of collective action and have more capacity to create prosperity; see also Robinson (1960) and Wei (1991). 5 Small is Beautiful. In arguing that size has its costs, AS join a long tradition of political philosophers, many of whom believe that small is beautiful. Plato quantified the optimal size of a city-state at 5,040 households. 6 Similarly in Politics Aristotle argued that a country should be small enough for the citizens to know (and hear!) each other; the entire territory should be small enough to be surveyed from a hill. More recently, Rousseau stated:
"Large populations, vast territories! There you have the first and foremost reason for the misfortunes of mankind, above all the countless calamities that weaken and destroy polite peoples. Almost all small states, republics and monarchies alike, prosper, simply because they are small, because all their citizens know each other and keep an eye on each other, and because their rulers can see for themselves the harm that is being done and the good that is theirs to do and can look on as their orders are being executed. Not so the large nations: they stagger under the weight of their own numbers, and their peoples lead a miserable existence --either, like yourselves, in conditions of anarchy, or under petty tyrants that the requirements of hierarchy oblige their kings to set over them. " 7 This line of reasoning stretches all the way to at least Myrdal (1968) .
Montesquieu famously believed that republican countries were necessarily small in both territory and population. His logic was that large countries were necessarily diverse and thus required strong governments, resulting in monarchies or even despots (for very large countries).
Small countries without excessive wealth were the most democratic. He famously wrote:
"In a large republic, the common good is sacrificed to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to various exceptions; it depends on accidents. In a small republic, the public good is more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive, and consequently less protected." 8 Interestingly, Montesquieu's logic was inverted by David Hume (1752), who argued in "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth" that " in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest."
Madison famously used this logic to argue that large countries were less likely to be affected by factions in The Federalist Papers 10.
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Previous Empirics
To my knowledge, there has been only almost no work on a national scale effect on the level of economic well-being argues that the reverse is also true). A number of different studies in Robinson (1960) tested for economies of scale and found them to be mostly unimportant. They also considered the impact of country size on national patterns of specialization, diversification, and competition, usually with a similar lack of success.
By way of contrast, there has been much work done which searches for a scale effect in economic growth. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) are typical of the literature and provide limited evidence of a scale effect on growth. Alcalá and Ciccone (2003) finds an effect of market size on growth, although Sala-i-Martin (1997) does not using a general structure econometric search methodology. Wacziarg (2000, 2004) focus on whether the effect (if any) of size on growth is mediated through openness; they find moderately supportive results using a panel of data and IV techniques. 10 But most of the focus in AS is in the causes and determination of country size rather than its effects.
The theoretical work in the literature implies that one might expect to find an effect of size on: output; inflation; communications infrastructure; crime; health; output and productivity; inequality; and heterogeneity. Rather than return to investigating growth, I now attempt to extend the search for scale effects and investigate whether a country's population has a substantial effect on the level of economic activity.
Empirics
My strategy in this paper is to take a broad-brush approach to the effect of scale on economic and social phenomena. I look at a large number of variables that are potentially affected by a country's population size, choosing them either on the basis of intrinsic interest or because they are suggested by the literature. I search for signs of a scale effect using both graphs and more conventional statistical techniques. Table A2 , and some descriptive statistics are provided in Table A3 .
The only "country" I exclude of any size is Taiwan, province of China (for data availability reasons 
A Visual Approach
Are there benefits or costs to a country being larger? I begin with a visual survey of the relationship between the size and attributes of countries. 13 Size is equated with population, as is reasonably standard. CPI inflation against population size for both the whole sample and excluding the (eleven) countries with annual inflation exceeding 20%. 17 Both scatters show an insignificant positive relation between country size and inflation, despite the view of e.g., Alesina and Spolaore that financial institutions might be expected to be superior and deliver lower inflation in larger countries. It is reassuring to note that openness (trade as a percentage of GDP) is strongly negatively associated with country size, as is widely known and expected (e.g., , Robinson, 1960 . 18 Military spending (again, as a percentage of GDP) is however not significantly tied to country size. It is also interesting that per capita ownership of automobiles, televisions, telephones, and personal computers all seem to decline (usually not significantly so) with country size.
Health and education are critical phenomena, both intrinsically and as measures or manifestations of economic development. Further, key parts of education and healthcare are often largely provided by the state; economies of scale in providing these public goods might be expected to lead to strong linkages between country size and policy outcomes. But there is in fact little evidence that larger states systematically provide better health and education from Larger countries just do not seem to be more developed than small countries in any systematic way.
Perhaps economic well-being and national institutions do not improve with country size because larger nations are systematically more diverse? This hypothesis, suggested by a number of scholars, is investigated in Figure 6 , which compares country size with nine different measures of national heterogeneity. Each of the small graphs presents a scatter-plot of a different measure of national heterogeneity against the natural logarithm of population.
There is little evidence that large countries are consistently and significantly more heterogeneous than smaller countries. The graphs are arranged so that heterogeneity rises along the ordinate (y-axis). If larger countries are more heterogeneous, the data should exhibit a positive slope. Six of the nine slopes are indeed positive. However, only one is significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels, the measure of linguistic diversity provided by Ethnologue. Still, the other measure of linguistic fractionalization (provided by is insignificantly linked to size (the two measures of linguistic heterogeneity have a correlation of .81). Further, ethnic polarization is significantly negatively associated with country size (the Gini coefficient and one of the two measures of religious fractionalization are negatively but insignificantly linked to size).
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To sum up, there seems to be no strong visual relationship between a country's population and a host of social phenomena of relevance. Larger countries do no seem to be much richer, healthier, better educated, more diverse, or better off than smaller countries. There is also little evidence from any of the graphical evidence above that one or two outlier countries dominate the data. The first impression one gets is that size simply does not matter.
A Statistical Approach
The graphical analysis presented above is suggestive but not definitive. For one thing, the analysis is bivariate, and does not control for other phenomena that might be relevant. o ε is a well-behaved residual, and o α, {γ}, {δ}, {ζ} are nuisance coefficients. Table 1 records the slope coefficient on country size, along with a robust standard error.
It is split into six panels, corresponding to the six different sets of graphics; each row corresponds to a different dependent variable. The coefficients on the nuisance parameters (for the control variables) are suppressed since they are not of intrinsic interest. The seven columns correspond to: a) bivariate OLS with {δ}={ζ}=0; b) OLS with {ζ}=0, controls set #1; c) OLS with {ζ}=0, controls set #2; d) OLS with {ζ}=0, controls set #3; e) fixed effects with {δ}=0; f)
IV with {δ}={ζ}=0; and g) IV with {ζ}=0, controls set #3.
Panel A shows that the real income per person is almost always negatively correlated with size. When the data are pooled across years, the relationship is significant at standard confidence levels when controls are included. The same is true of most cross-sections, and all the bivariate IV results; it seems reasonable to conclude that larger countries are not systematically richer. If anything, the opposite is a better description of the data. Table A4 provides extensive sensitivity analysis that shows that confirms this conclusion. On the other hand, five of the nine bivariate IV estimates indicate that larger countries are significantly more heterogeneous than smaller countries. Even this moderate result is fragile:
only one of the nine coefficients (that for geographic dispersion) is significantly positive when controls are added.
To summarize: the statistical analysis broadly confirms the impression left by the graphs.
There is little evidence that countries with more people perform measurably better. Indeed a good broad-brush characterization is that a country's population has no significant consistent impact on its well-being. The one strong and well-known exception is that smaller countries are consistently and significantly more open to international trade than larger countries. 
Remaining Issues
It would be natural and interesting to compare crime rates across countries. The key issue here is the fact that different jurisdictions collect crime data in incompatible ways; in 2000, the UN data set indicates that the country with the lowest crime rate was Pakistan with a rate of 2.23/100,000 inhabitants (the second-highest crime rate was Sweden in 1990 with 14,240). 29 A simple regression of the crime rate against the log of population delivers a negative effect of country size on the crime rate if one controls for year effects, but a positive effect if one controls for country effects. It would also be interesting to extend the analysis to cover conflicts, civil and external. 30 Finally, the post-war patterns may not be representative of earlier periods of time, especially given the large waves of migration that have occurred historically. Indeed, if an accurate data set could be constructed, emigration and immigration would be useful to analyze since they are prima facie indicators of a country's well-being.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper is motivated by the fact that countries have vastly different sizes. To my knowledge, there is no theoretical model that explains the wide variation in size across countries.
Should we worry? My initial answer is negative. In this empirical paper, I have searched for but not found evidence that country size (measured as population) matters for economic outcomes.
More precisely, I have not been able to find a consistent strong country scale effect on any phenomena other than openness. Country size simply seems not to matter.
This seems unsurprising. If larger countries offered a systematically higher quality of life, this would be part of common culture and received street wisdom. My finding is also consistent with received wisdom; for instance Dahl and Tufte (1973, p19) state "… we also find that levels of socioeconomic development are independent of total population …" While this work is an exploratory exercise, it does have ramifications for existing academic research. Many economic models -in economic growth, international trade, urban economics, and public finance -imply that the size of larger countries is economically advantageous in should deliver higher output, cheaper public goods, and so forth. A number of political philosophers argue that larger countries should have inferior institutions. Given the theoretical importance of size in many economic and political models, it may also be interesting to ask why size seems not to matter. Scale effects may occur only at the sub-national level. I find no evidence that small countries endogenously overcome their disadvantages by becoming more effective at providing public or private goods, others may have more success in finding offsetting effects. There may also be more subtle ways to find national scale effects, e.g., by employing different controls or more structural techniques. Such issues may warrant future research.
Agents with large endowments tend to be proud of them, often considering them to be so intrinsically valuable as to compensate for a variety of other defects. Are they? In this paper I have asked whether countries endowed with large populations have measurably higher economic welfare. The answer is negative; the size -population -of a country seems to have little relationship to most anything of economic interest. This seems intuitive, is consistent with conventional wisdom and allows one to understand that countries vary enormously in size. A country's size just doesn't seem to matter for its economic institutions and performance. . Slope coefficient for log of country population; robust standard errors (clustered by countries, where appropriate) in parentheses. Intercept/year effects are included but not recorded. * (**) indicates significantly different from zero at the .05 (.01) level. OLS estimates unless noted. Controls set #1 (20 variables) includes: urbanization rate, density rate, and dummy variables for "countries" that are a) landlocked, island dummy, log of latitude (kilometers from equator), regional dummies for developing countries from Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Europe-Central Asia, Middle East-North Africa, High Income country dummy, and language dummies for English, French, German, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese. Controls set #2 (25 variables) includes all controls in 1 plus: dummies for post-WW2 country, (1800,1945) country, and dependencies, OPEC members, and COMECON members. Controls set #3 (27 variables) includes all controls in sets 2 (and 1) plus: log real GDP per capita in $; and proportion of land within 100 km of ice-free coastline or navigable river. Income is excluded as a control in income equations Fixed effects adds country-specific fixed effects. IV uses log of total area as instrumental variable for log population. IV with controls refers to controls set #3 without density. Are Countries Changing Size? Figure A1 : Histograms of Country Size over Time 19 It would be natural and interesting to compare crime rates across countries. The key issue here is the fact that different jurisdictions collect crime data in incompatible ways; in 2000, the UN data set indicates that the country with the lowest crime rate was Pakistan with a rate of 2.23/100,000 inhabitants (the second-highest crime rate was Sweden in 1990 with 14,240); see www.unodc.org. A simple regression of the crime rate against the log of population delivers a negative effect of country size on the crime rate if one controls for year effects, but a positive effect if one controls for country effects. 20 The Polity IV project is available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ 21 http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 22 The KKZ data on aggregate governance indicators are available from the World Bank's website at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/indicators.htm, while the Transparency International corruption perceptions index is available at http://www.icgg.org/overview.csv 23 On the ESI, the ILO states "We propose that it is the combination of securities that make up economic security, and that this constitutes a decent work environment… In a sense, decent work can be said to exist when individuals have a decent level of income security, decent representation security, decent work security, and the real freedom to pursue whatever of the other forms of work-related securities they desire. … Economic security is measured as a combination of the normalized values of the seven socio-economic security indexes to yield a composite measure designated the Economic Security Index (ESI). The ESI is defined as a weighted average of the scores of the seven forms of security, in which double weight is given to income security and to representation security, for reasons that basic income security is essential for real freedom to make choices and that representation security is essential to enable the vulnerable to retain income security. The ILO provides definitions of "economic security" at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/ses/download/docs/definition.pdf. 24 The WDI defines the latter two as follows: "Quasi-liquid liabilities are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements, plus travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. They equal the M3 money supply less transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1)." "Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available (including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations." 25 Perhaps the most striking feature of the figure is the cross-country diversity in domestic diversity, not the fact that the variation is not closely linked to country size. 26 The first stage fits well; when I regress the log of population against the log of area (and time dummies), I get an R 2 of .68 and a robust t-statistic on log area of 19. 27 Clearly the third set of controls cannot be added when the regressand is real GDP per capita. Also, since all the measures of heterogeneity are cross-sectional no fixed effects estimates are possible for Panel F. 28 I have also substituted both the log of the labor force and the log of the population between ages 15 and 64 in place of the log of population. Neither alternative measure of country size leads to different conclusions. 29 The UN data are available through www.unodc.org. 30 Dahl and Tufte (1973, p 122) conclude "… a country's chances of survival do not depend significantly on its size." Preliminary work indicates that civil wars are increasing in country size.
